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V.   CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 221 
I am not an advocate for frequent changes in laws and 
Constitutions. But laws and institutions must go hand in 
hand with the progress of the human mind. As that 
becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new 
discoveries are made, new truths discovered and manners 
and opinions change, with the change of circumstances, 
institutions must advance also to keep pace with the times. 
We might as well require a man to wear still the coat 
which fitted him when a boy as civilized society to remain 
ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In DeCook v. Olmsted Medical Center, Inc., the Minnesota 
Supreme Court issued a decision that may signal a shift towards a 
more pragmatic application of Minnesota’s rules of service.2 In 
DeCook, the court held that a party can properly amend a summons 
and complaint as long as it does not substantially burden the 
defendant.3 In addition, the court held that alternative methods of 
service through an agent, such as e-mail, are sufficient if consented 
to by the defendant.4 As part of this decision, the court held that 
the plaintiff has the initial burden of producing evidence to show 
an alternative method of service existed, which, if met, shifts the 
burden to the defendant to establish that the method of service was 
ineffective.5 
This Note begins by giving a selected history of service and 
rules of civil procedure,6 an overview of traditional and technology-
aided ways of effectuating service,7 and an overview of the history of 
notice pleading in federal and Minnesota state courts.8 Next, this 
1.  Thomas Jefferson Quotes, GOODREADS, http://www.goodreads.com/quotes
/94629-i-am-not-an-advocate-for-frequent-changes-in-laws (last visited Sept. 28, 
2016). 
2.  See DeCook v. Olmsted Med. Ctr., Inc., 875 N.W.2d 263 (Minn. 2016).
3.  Id. at 269.
4.  Id. at 271–72.
5.  Id. at 271.
6.  See infra Section II.A.
7.  See infra Section II.B.
8.  See infra Section II.C.
2
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Note explores the DeCook decision, discussing the facts of the case 
and the rationale of both the majority and dissenting opinions.9 
Although this Note concludes that the majority came to the 
correct decision, justice would be better served if the court adopted 
what this author calls the “reasonable actual notice” standard.10 
Doing so, this Note contends, would better align with the policy 
behind both the Federal and Minnesota Rules of Civil procedure11 
and would allow for greater flexibility in a shifting legal landscape.12 
If Minnesota courts find it prudent to adopt the “reasonable actual 
notice” standard, this author proposes a modified burden-shifting 
framework that may better ensure disputes are resolved on their 
merits.13 
II. HISTORY OF THE RELEVANT LAW
A. General History of Service and the Rules of Civil Procedure 
Put simply, service occurs in a civil case when a party delivers 
legal documentation to the defendant being sued.14 The core 
purposes of service are twofold: (1) to provide a court jurisdiction 
over the defendant and (2) to put the party being sued on notice of 
the lawsuit.15 
In 1938, Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which included official rules for effective service.16 In 
1947, the Minnesota Supreme Court Advisory Committee prepared 
9.  See infra Part III.
10.  See infra Part IV.
11.  See infra Sections IV.A.1, 3.
12.  See infra Section IV.A.2.
13.  See infra Section IV.B.
14.  What Is Service of Process?, THE LAW DICTIONARY, 
http://thelawdictionary.org/service-of-process/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2016) 
(defining service of process as “the term for the delivery of a summons, writ or 
subpoena to the opposing party in a law suit”). Many may be familiar with the 
common phrase, “You’ve been served”—a phrase often used to depict a process 
server serving a party with legal documents. See Kimberly Faber, “You’ve Been 
Served.” To Say it or Not to Say it?, SERVENOW (Aug. 7, 2012), https://www.serve         
-now.com/articles/1277/youve-been-served. This phrase, however, is not required 
by law and is rarely said by process servers outside of television and film. See id. 
15.  In re Skyline Materials, Ltd., 835 N.W.2d 472, 475 (Minn. 2013).
16.  See Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical
Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 691 (1998). 
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a set of rules closely mirroring the federal rules.17 Those rules, now 
known as the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, were 
subsequently adopted by the Minnesota Supreme Court in 1952.18 
Changes to the Minnesota rules have been made throughout the 
years, primarily mirroring developments in the federal rules.19 
Closely tied to the notion of service is the principle of personal 
jurisdiction: a court can exercise authority over a defendant only if 
it has personal jurisdiction over that defendant and adequate 
service of process has occurred.20 In early American jurisprudence, 
a court’s jurisdiction21 could be established only if the defendant’s 
property was located in the forum state or the defendant was 
personally served within the limits of the forum state.22 Later, 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes reiterated the preference for 
personal service and cautioned against relying on service by 
publication.23 Then, in 1945, the Supreme Court began a transition 
to a more flexible approach towards personal jurisdiction and 
service of process.24 In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, the Court 
determined that personal jurisdiction over a defendant existed 
17. David F. Herr & JoLynn M. Markison, E-Discovery Under the Minnesota
Rules: Where We’ve Been, Where We Might be Headed, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 390, 393 
(2014). 
18.  See id.
19.  Id. at 393–94.
20.  See Jeremy A. Colby, You’ve Got Mail: The Modern Trend Towards Universal
Electronic Service of Process, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 337, 338–40 (2003) (giving a brief 
overview of the ways in which the notions of service of process and personal 
jurisdiction dovetailed during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries). 
21.  See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722–23 (1877) (“And so it is laid down
by jurists, as an elementary principle, that the laws of one State have no operation 
outside of its territory . . . .”). 
22.  See id. at 727. The Court in Pennoyer reasoned that the law assumes an
individual is always in “possession” of his or her property, and if a court seizes it, 
that individual will be on notice of the seizure as well as the impending suit. Id. 
Thus, personal service is not necessary when seizure of the defendant’s property 
located in the forum state occurs. Id. 
23.  See McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917) (“There is no dispute that
service by publication does not warrant a personal judgment against a 
nonresident. . . . To dispense with personal service the substitute that is most likely 
to reach the defendant is the least that ought to be required if substantial justice is 
to be done.” (internal citations omitted)). 
24.  See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Joelle Lee A.
Nicol, Note, Given an Opportunity to Redefine the Gray Area of “Minimum Contacts,” 
The Court in Prince v. Urban Chose to Remain in the Dark, 25 W. ST. U. L. REV. 313, 
315–16 (1998). 
4
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when the defendant “establish[ed] sufficient contacts or ties with 
the state of the forum to make it reasonable and just according to 
our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice to 
permit the state to enforce the obligations which [the defendant 
had] incurred there.”25 
Additionally, in International Shoe, the Supreme Court 
appeared to expand on the notion of allowing different forms of 
service: “[i]t is enough that appellant has established such contacts 
with the state that the particular form of substituted service[26] 
adopted there gives reasonable assurance that the notice will be 
actual.”27 When interstate commerce became more commonplace,28 
the Court further shifted focus to ensure that service provided a 
defendant with fair and reasonable notice of legal action.29 In 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., the court laid out 
general principles for notice: 
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due 
process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality 
is notice reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to 
present their objections . . . . But if with due regard for 
the practicalities and peculiarities of the case these 
conditions are reasonably met the constitutional 
requirements are satisfied.30 
The principles articulated in Mullane continue to guide the legal 
system’s view of service of process today.31 
25.  Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 320.
26.  “Substituted service” is defined as “service by leaving a copy of the
process at the residence or abode or place of business of the defendant.” 72 C.J.S. 
Process § 70, Westlaw (databased updated Mar. 2017). Substituted service is 
“different and distinct from [personal service],” but “for some purposes 
substituted service is deemed equivalent to personal service.” Id.  
27.  Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 320.
28.  See, e.g., McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 220–23 (1957) (“With
this increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great increase in the 
amount of business conducted by mail across state lines . . . ma[king] it much less 
burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in 
economic activity.”). 
29.  See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314–17
(1950) (reasoning that service by publication affords adequate service as long as it 
gives reasonable notice to defendant).  
30.  Id. at 314–15.
31.  See Craig J. Knobbe, Tenth Circuit Survey: Securities Law, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 
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B. Manners of Effectuating Service 
1. Traditional
Minnesota law has often reflected the stringent historical 
standards of effective service.32 According to the Minnesota Rules of 
Civil Procedure, there are three primary ways of effectuating service 
on individuals.33 First, personal service is valid when a summons is 
delivered personally to the individual, left at that person’s place of 
abode,34 or left with an agent authorized by statute to accept service 
on the defendant’s behalf.35 Traditionally, personal service is 
deemed ineffective if it is left with an agent who is not authorized 
to accept service.36 Second, service can be made by mailing a 
summons and complaint to the defendant, provided the defendant 
returns an included acknowledgment of service form.37 And third, 
in rare circumstances, service by publication constitutes valid 
service.38 
Unless service is waived,39 Minnesota commonly does not allow 
service that is not authorized by statute or Rule 4 of the Minnesota 
903, 904 n.10 (1999) (citing 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1074, at 465 (2d ed. 1987)) (“[Mullane] 
generally is recognized as the keystone of modern philosophy regarding the notice 
requirement and its importance should not be underestimated.”).  
32.  See, e.g., Cabanne v. Graf, 87 Minn. 510, 514–15, 92 N.W. 461, 462 (1902)
(holding that serving a non-citizen of the state when that individual is not in the 
state is unconstitutional). 
33.  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.03, .04, .07.
34.  See, e.g., Berryhill v. Sepp, 106 Minn. 458, 459, 119 N.W. 404, 405 (1909)
(holding that usual place of abode is an individual’s residence or the place he is 
living at the time of service). 
35.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.03(a).
36.  See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Allen, 590 N.W.2d 820, 823 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999)
(“[S]ervice on a party’s attorney is ineffective unless the party has previously 
appointed the attorney to accept service.”). 
37.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.05.
38.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.04; see also Gill v. Gill, 277 Minn. 166, 172, 152 N.W.2d
309, 313 (1967) (holding that service by publication is valid only if it is the sole 
option for effective service). For an in-depth discussion on service by publication 
in Minnesota, see Jessica Klander, Note, Civil Procedure: Facebook Friend or Foe?: The 
Impact of Modern Communication on Historical Standards for Service of Process—
Shamrock Development v. Smith, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 241 (2009). 
39.  See, e.g., Chauncey v. Wass, 35 Minn. 1, 15, 30 N.W. 826, 831 (1886) (“[A]
party . . . may waive anything intended for his benefit—such as notice, or service of 
process . . . .”). 
6
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Rules of Civil Procedure.40 Many federal courts, however, have 
deemed service effective as long as the federal rules of service are 
substantially complied with.41 Similarly, despite usually adhering 
closely to the rules of service, Minnesota courts have considered 
service effective when the plaintiff substantially complies with the 
rules of service and the defendant has actual notice of suit.42 
Currently, in Minnesota, substantial compliance combined with 
adequate notice has been recognized only when service occurs at a 
defendant’s usual place of abode.43 According to the Minnesota 
Supreme Court, there is “no place [other than the defendant’s 
residence] significantly more desirable for the papers to be left.”44 
40.  See, e.g., Allen, 590 N.W.2d at 822 (holding that service that is not
authorized by Rule 4 is ineffective). 
41.  See, e.g., Lavarias v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, No. 09-cv-00120DAE/RLP,
2011 WL 1361555, at *3 (D. Haw. Apr. 11, 2011) (citing SEC v. Ross, 504 F.3d 
1130, 1140 (9th Cir. 2007)) (“A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant if the plaintiff can demonstrate ‘substantial compliance’ with Rule 4. 
Actual notice, however, without substantial compliance with Rule 4, will not 
provide personal jurisdiction.”); Munson v. England, No. 04-cv-0248-RRB/CMK, 
2008 WL 162774, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2008) (“Here, plaintiff substantially 
complied with Rule 4(i) by sending a copy of the summons and complaint to the 
U.S. Attorney’s office. He addressed the envelope to the assistant U.S. Attorney 
assigned to this case, whom had contacted him previously, instead of addressed to 
the ‘civil process clerk.’ Given the need to liberally construe pro se pleading, the 
undersigned finds plaintiff substantially complied with Rule 4, and the U.S. 
Attorney’s office was given actual notice.”); In re Chinin USA, Inc., 327 B.R. 325, 
333 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005) (“Substantial compliance with the service requirements 
of Rule 4 is sufficient so long as the opposing party receives sufficient notice of the 
complaint. Dismissal is generally not justified absent a showing of prejudice.” 
(citations omitted)). 
42.  See, e.g., Van Note v. 2007 Pontiac, 787 N.W.2d 214, 220 (Minn. Ct. App.
2010) (holding that service was effective when officer had substantially complied 
with service rules by personally leaving notice at the defendant’s place of abode 
with an individual who told the officer she would give the notice to defendant and 
defendant did in fact have actual notice of suit); O’Sell v. Peterson, 595 N.W.2d 
870, 872–73 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that when service is left at an 
individual’s place of abode with an individual who has a “substantial nexus” with 
the defendant and the defendant has actual notice of suit, service is effective). 
43.  See In re Disciplinary Action Against Coleman, 793 N.W.2d 296, 302
(Minn. 2011) (citing Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580 (Minn. 1988)) (holding that 
the rules governing service should be liberally construed when substitute service 
occurs at an individual’s residence and that individual has notice of the suit); 
Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 584 (“This ‘actual notice’ exception, however, has been 
recognized only in cases involving substitute service at defendant’s residence.”). 
44.  Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 584 (citing 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 31,
7
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Therefore, substantial compliance combined with actual notice is 
not sufficient when a defendant is served at his place of business.45 
Recently, Minnesota courts further discussed the reach of 
actual notice. In Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings, LLC, a dispute 
concerning ineffective service for the foreclosure of a townhome, 
the Minnesota Court of Appeals found that a party need only 
substantially comply with the substitute service46 requirements as 
long as the defendant has actual notice of suit.47 In the subsequent 
appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed this issue, 
determining whether Rule 4.03(a) of the Minnesota Rules of Civil 
Procedure required strict compliance.48 In its decision, the court 
determined that the court of appeals’ reliance on Thiele v. Stich was 
misplaced.49 According to the Minnesota Supreme Court, “the 
statement from Thiele was still dictum and therefore not binding on 
us.”50 Thus, the court relied on MacLean v. Lasely to determine that 
“substitute-service requirements are subject to strict compliance.”51 
The court went on to quote MacLean, stating that “[i]n making 
such substitute service there must be a strict compliance with the 
statute.”52 The court in MacLean held that “statutory service is not 
dispensed with by the mere fact that defendant may in some way 
learn of the existence of the papers and an attempted service.”53 In 
turn, the Jaeger court determined that substitute service must be 
strictly complied with, regardless of the defendant’s actual notice.54 
§ 1096, at 79).
45.  Id. (citing Thompson v. Kerr, 555 F. Supp. 1090, 1093 (S.D. Ohio 1982))
(“Rule 4 is otherwise taken literally, and cannot be satisfied by service on [a] 
defendant’s place of work or business.”). 
46. “[S]ubstituted service under Rule 4.03, Rules of Civil Procedure—that is,
service upon an individual by leaving a copy at his usual place of abode with some 
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein—is a form of 
‘personal’ service. In fact, Rule 4.03 labels as personal this form of service.” Lebens 
v. Harbeck, 308 Minn. 433, 434, 243 N.W.2d 128, 129 (1976); see also 72 C.J.S.,
supra note 26, § 70 (defining “substituted service”).  
47. No. A14-0803, 2015 WL 1513982, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2015).
48.  Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings, LLC, 884 N.W.2d 601, 608–10 (Minn.
2016). 
49.  See id. at 610–11 (citing Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 584).
50.  Id.
51.  Id. at 609 (citing MacLean v. Lasely, 181 Minn. 379, 380, 232 N.W. 632,
632 (1930)). 
52.  Id. (quoting MacLean, 181 Minn. at 380, 232 N.W. at 632).
53.  Id. (quoting MacLean, 181 Minn. at 380, 232 N.W. at 632).
54.  Id.
8
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Rule 3.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure governs 
when an action is commenced.55 Each section of Rule 3.01 requires 
a particular form of service for the commencement of an action.56 
In 2015, the Minnesota legislature enacted an amendment to Rule 
3.01(b), allowing for any method of service as long as the parties 
consent to the alternative method.57 Thus, parties were given 
greater freedom in selecting a convenient method of service, which 
signaled a shift towards more practical means of service. 
Currently, Minnesota courts rely on a burden-shifting method 
to determine if an alternative method of service was adequate.58 
First, to show that a different method of service was valid, the 
plaintiff is tasked with presenting evidence of an agreement.59 If the 
plaintiff meets this burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to 
establish that service was improper.60 Thus, a defendant fails to 
meet his burden if he produces no evidence to the contrary.61 
2. Using Technology
Since 2000, worldwide internet use has risen dramatically.62 
Today, in the United States alone, nearly eighty-nine percent of the 
population has access to the internet.63 The legal system, in turn, 
55.  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 3.01.
56.  Id.
57.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 3.01(b) advisory committee’s comment to 2015
amendment (allowing for consent to e-mail service even though the rules do not 
specifically list it as effective service). 
58.  See, e.g., Holmes v. Conter, 212 Minn. 394, 395, 4 N.W.2d 106, 107 (1942)
(“Defendants’ counsel concedes that the burden is on him to overcome [proof of 
effective service] of the deputy sheriff by evidence which has been proven to be 
clear and satisfactory.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)); Godfrey v. 
Valentine, 39 Minn. 336, 338, 40 N.W. 163, 164 (1888) (holding that when service 
by publication is on the record, other proof of service must be affirmatively 
shown); Fish v. Janson, No. A15-1949, 2016 WL 2946263, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. 
May 23, 2016) (holding that defendant did not meet his burden of showing that 
the residence where he was served was not his usual place of abode). 
59. Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith, 754 N.W. 2d 377, 384 (Minn. 2008).
60.  Id.
61.  Id.
62.  See Internet Users, INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://www.internetlivestats.com
/internet-users/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2016). In the year 2000, 6.8% of the world’s 
population had an internet connection; as of 2016, just over 46% of the world’s 
population has an internet connection. Id. 
63.  See id. The United States’ internet access has risen from 43% to almost
89% of the population in the past sixteen years. Id. 
9
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has adapted to this changing landscape and integrated technology 
use into legal proceedings as well as service of process.64 For many 
years, courts authorized only traditional means of service, such as 
personal service, service by mail, or service by publication.65 In 
1980, however, a federal court first acknowledged the use of 
different technologies in service of process.66 In New England 
Merchants National Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission Co., 
a federal court allowed service through “Telex”67 to defendants in 
Iran because other means of service were not practicable.68 In its 
opinion, the court reasoned that “[j]ustice demands that a 
substitute form of service be formulated—one calculated to provide 
defendants with adequate notice of the pendency and nature of the 
instant suits.”69 Notably, the court opined that the legal system 
“cannot be blind to changes and advances in technology . . . . No 
longer must process be mailed to a defendant’s door when he can 
receive complete notice at an electronic terminal inside his very 
office . . . .”70 
In the years following, courts sparingly authorized service 
through facsimile. For instance, in In re International Telemedia 
Associates, Inc., a district court judge found that the defendant was 
64.  See, e.g., 25 Years Later, PACER, Electronic Filing Continue to Change Courts,
U.S. CTS. (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2013/12/09/25-years      
-later -pacer-electronic-filing-continue-change-courts (opining that programs such 
as PACER and electronic filing in the federal court system have “reduced stress” by 
implementing “an efficient system” that “[e]ven skeptics have grown to love”). 
65.  See supra Section II.A.
66.  See New England Merchants Nat’l Bank v. Iran Power Generation &
Transmission Co., 495 F. Supp. 73, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
67.  Telex, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/telex (last visited Sept. 28, 2016) (defining Telex as “a system of communication 
in which messages are sent over long distances by using a telephone system and 
are printed by using a special machine (called a teletypewriter)”). Telex is 
essentially an early hybrid of the telegraph, text messaging, and facsimile. Many 
people, like this author, may have no idea what a Telex communication is or have 
never seen a “teletypewriter.” This arguably shows how important flexible rules 
governing service are, as any kind of technology (mail, fax, e-mail) could become 
obsolete in the not-so-distant future. 
68.  New England Merchants, 495 F. Supp. at 81. In this instance, the judge
acknowledged there was little to no precedent for authorizing service via Telex. 
However, the judge found that the breakdown of American and Iranian relations 
coupled with the defendants’ avoidance of service made Telex an effective method 
of service. Id. at 80–81. 
69.  Id. at 81.
70.  Id.
10
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evading service and authorized facsimile as an alternate method of 
service.71 Furthermore, Telemedia Associates was the first federal case 
that authorized e-mail as an alternative method of service.72 Later, 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals authorized the use of e-mail to 
serve an international online company that listed only an e-mail 
address on its website.73 Following this decision, other courts set the 
general standard that service via e-mail could be authorized if other 
methods of service had proven unsuccessful.74 
An illustrative example of technology’s assistance in the legal 
field comes in the form of the “best notice practicable” standard in 
71. 245 B.R. 713, 718 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000) (holding facsimile, among
other methods, to be a proper alternative method of service because it was 
“virtually impossible” to locate the defendant and “effect service by any of the 
traditional means specified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”). 
72.  Id. at 722 (“Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the Trustee’s
service of process upon Diaz by facsimile transmission, electronic mail, and mail to 
his last known address provides a sufficient basis for the Court’s exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over Diaz.”). 
73. Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002).
In its opinion, the court acknowledged that the only contact address for the 
defendant was an e-mail address, and thus, e-mail was the best method to apprise 
the defendant of the suit. The court went on to say: 
RII had neither an office nor a door; it had only a computer terminal. 
If any method of communication is reasonably calculated to provide 
RII with notice, surely it is email—the method of communication 
which RII utilizes and prefers . . . . Indeed, when faced with an 
international e-business scofflaw, playing hide-and-seek with the federal 
court, email may be the only means of effecting service of process. 
Certainly in this case, it was a means reasonably calculated to apprise RII of 
the pendency of the lawsuit, and the Constitution requires nothing more. 
Id. (emphasis added). The court in Rio Properties, however, also discussed concerns 
about e-mail service, including limitations with the use of electronic signatures, 
confirming receipt of a message, and attaching exhibits to the service 
documentation. Id. Thus, the Ninth Circuit directed district courts to balance the 
limitations with the benefits in each dispute. Id.  
74.  See, e.g., Ryan v. Brunswick Corp., No. 02-cv-0133E(F), 2002 WL 1628933,
at *2 (W.D.N.Y. May 31, 2002) (finding service by electronic means 
constitutionally permissible and holding that “a party need not exhaust all possible 
methods of service” for a court to authorize electronic service but must show it has 
“reasonably attempted to effectuate service on the defendant(s)”); Hollow v. 
Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d 704, 705, 707–08 (Sup. Ct. 2002) (authorizing service by e-
mail in divorce proceedings when defendant moved to Saudi Arabia and plaintiff 
“exercised due diligence” by trying to serve defendant through his employer and 
through an international process service). 
11
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class action lawsuits.75 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin is a widely 
influential case on the “best notice practicable” requirement.76 In 
Eisen, the Supreme Court held that it was mandatory to include 
individual notice to class members who can be identified through 
reasonable efforts.77 Courts, however, have hesitated to set a 
standard for those who cannot be identified through reasonable 
effort.78 In the twenty-first century, new technology—especially the 
internet—has shaped the legal system’s view of what constitutes 
best practicable notice.79 For instance, some courts have 
75. The concerns regarding giving notice to a large number of plaintiff class
members is admittedly different than the concerns regarding giving adequate 
notice to individual defendants. However, the seminal case for both class actions 
and service of process is widely considered to be Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank. 
See 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Both service of process and decisions regarding class 
actions rely on Justice Jackson’s stated principle that “the fundamental requisite of 
due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.” Id. at 314 (quoting Grannis v. 
Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)). Notably, Mullane’s principles have been 
codified in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, governing class 
actions, while they have not been codified in Rule 4, governing service. See FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23(c) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment. Nonetheless, courts 
today continue to use the standards set out in Mullane for service of process 
analysis without those standards being expressly codified in the rules governing 
service. See Knobbe, supra note 31, at 904 n.10. 
76.  Brian Walters, “Best Notice Practicable” in the Twenty-First Century, 2003
UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 4 (2003) (“The most influential case on the ‘best notice 
practicable’ requirement of FRCP 23(c)(2) is Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline.”). 
77. 417 U.S. 156, 176 (1974) (“Accordingly, each class member who can be
identified through reasonable effort must be notified that he may request 
exclusion from the action and thereby preserve his opportunity to press his claim 
separately or that he may remain in the class and perhaps participate in the 
management of the action.”). 
78.  See, e.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 729
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (citing In re Franklin Nat’l Bank Sec. Litig., 599 F.2d 1109 (2d Cir. 
1978)) (“What is ‘the best notice practicable under the circumstances’ and what 
constitutes ‘reasonable effort’ is a determination of fact to be made in the 
individual litigation.”). 
79.  See generally Robert H. Klonoff et. al., Making Class Actions Work: The
Untapped Potential of the Internet, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 727 (2008) (discussing the 
opportunity the internet gives to class members to participate actively in class 
action litigation); Jennifer Mingus, E-Mail: A Constitutional (and Economical) Method 
of Transmitting Class Action Notice, 47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 87 (1999) (discussing the due 
process implications, practicality, and cost savings of e-mail, as well as the 
difficulties courts have had embracing use of e-mail for notice in class action 
litigation). 
12
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increasingly accepted the use of e-mail as best practicable notice.80 
With technological growth and society’s increasing dependence on 
technology, courts have begun to interpret the best practicable 
notice standard as allowing, and at times requiring, the use of 
newer technology in class action notice.81 Thus, because an 
individual’s due process rights may be violated if notice is not 
proper, some courts have adapted to societal change and found 
newer technological means to be the “best practicable notice under 
the circumstances.”82 As illustrated in the following paragraph, the 
area of service may already be experiencing a similar adaptation. 
In general, Minnesota has mirrored federal courts’ adoption 
of technology in its rules of civil procedure.83 In 1996, the 
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure first included a mechanism for 
service by facsimile.84 Without consent, however, facsimile remains 
an ineffective method of service in Minnesota.85 It was not until 
80.  See, e.g., Keirsey v. eBay, Inc., No. 12-cv-01200-JST, 2014 WL 644697, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2014) (“The Court already preliminarily approved the form of 
class notice, primarily through email . . . . Moreover, information about the case 
has been available at the class website and through internet news sources. The 
Court finds that the form and method of notice was proper.”); see also Elizabeth 
M.C. Scheibel, #rule23 #classaction #notice: Using Social Media, Text Messaging, and 
Other New Communications Technology for Class Action Notice and Returning to Rule 
23(c)(2)(b)’s “Best Notice Practicable” Standard, 42 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 1331, 
1349 (2016) (providing examples of e-mail being used for notice). 
81.  See, e.g., In re Glob. Crossing Sec. & ERISA Litig., 225 F.R.D. 436, 449
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that notice via the internet, combined with other forms 
of notice, such as mail, constituted adequate notice). 
82.  See, e.g., Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 786 (7th Cir. 2004)
(“[N]ewspaper notice alone is not always an adequate alternative to individual 
notice. The World Wide Web is an increasingly important method of 
communication, and, of particular pertinence here, an increasingly important 
substitute for newspapers.” (internal citations omitted)). 
83.  See Herr & Markison, supra note 17, at 394.
84.  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 5.02(c) advisory committee’s note to 1996
amendment (“Most of Rule 5.02 is new and for the first time provides for service 
by facsimile . . . . Service by facsimile has become widely accepted and is used in 
Minnesota either by agreement or presumption . . . . [But] express authorization 
for service by facsimile is appropriate and preferable . . . .”). 
85.  See, e.g., Kmart Corp. v. Cty. of Clay, 711 N.W.2d 485, 490 (Minn. 2006)
(“Because facsimile service is not authorized for service of initiating documents in 
the rules of civil procedure, we agree with the tax court that faxing the petitions to 
the offices of the county assessor and the county attorney did not effect valid 
service.”); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Allen, 590 N.W.2d 820, 822 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) 
(citing Tullis v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 570 N.W.2d 309, 311 (Minn. 1997)) 
(“Facsimile transmission of a summons is not permitted under rule 4. Service was 
13
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2015 that the Minnesota rules committee acknowledged e-mail as a 
method of service.86 The rules committee amended Rule 3.01(b) to 
allow for service “made by mail or other means consented to by the 
defendant.”87 The comment to the amendment specifies that “a 
party may consent to service by ordinary electronic mail even 
though the rules do not otherwise provide for it.”88 Although an 
agreement must be in place, this change signals an 
acknowledgement of the prevalence new technology has in the 
legal world.89 
3. Amending Service
An overview of methods of service would not be complete 
without discussing the ability to amend a chosen method of service. 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide courts the discretion 
to allow a party to amend service, pleadings, motions, and the 
like.90 Similarly, as early as 1890, Minnesota courts and rules have 
also allowed procedural amendments.91 For instance, in Lockway v. 
Modern Woodmen of America, the Minnesota Supreme Court held 
that a summons could be amended to cure an inadvertent 
mistake.92 Today, Rule 4.07 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil 
Procedure governs the amendment of documents that have been 
therefore ineffective, and the district court did not have personal jurisdiction over 
Allen.”). 
86.  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 3.01(b) advisory committee’s note to 2015
amendment (“This rule is amended to add the explicit provision for consent to 
service by any means in subdivision (b), not only service by mail. If the party to be 
served consents to service, the service is effective and constitutionally sound 
regardless of method. Thus, a party may consent to service by ordinary electronic 
mail even though the rules do not otherwise provide for it.” (emphasis added)). 
87.  Id.
88.  See id.
89.  See generally Svetlana Gitman, (Dis)service of Process: The Need to Amend Rule
4 to Comply with Modern Usage of Technology, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 459 (2012) 
(discussing the prevalence of technology in the American legal system and 
proposing the theory that service through technological means would better satisfy 
due process in certain situations). 
90.  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4(a)(2) (“The court may permit a summons to be
amended.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 4(l)(3) (“The court may permit proof of service to be 
amended.”). 
91.  See, e.g., Burr v. Seymour, 43 Minn. 401, 402, 45 N.W. 715, 716 (1890)
(“The power of the court to amend the record in such a case cannot be 
doubted.”). 
92. 116 Minn. 115, 118, 133 N.W. 398, 399 (1911).
14
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served. Rule 4.07 allows for amendment of summons, other 
process, or proof of service if the court, in its discretion, 
determines that a party’s substantial rights will not be prejudiced.93 
Thus, amendments are encouraged to help ensure a dispute is 
resolved on its merits and not simply dismissed on a mere 
technicality.94 
C. The Notice Pleading Standard 
When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 
1938, a more flexible standard of pleading was introduced.95 In fact, 
Rule 8, governing pleadings, calls only for “a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief.”96 Although initially challenged, the rule governing 
pleadings remained unchanged.97 In 1957, in Conley v. Gibson, the 
Supreme Court held that “a complaint should not be dismissed for 
failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the 
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim . . . .”98 For 
the most part, courts followed the standard laid out in Conley v. 
Gibson.99 
93.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.07; see also Nelson v. Glenwood Hills Hosps., 240 Minn.
505, 514, 62 N.W.2d 73, 79 (1953) (“[A]mendments shall be given freely when 
justice so requires.”). 
94.  Cf. Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 316 (1988) (“[T]he
requirements of the rules of procedure should be liberally construed and . . . 
‘mere technicalities’ should not stand in the way of consideration of a case on its 
merits.”). Furthermore, invoking this very same principle, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court, in DeCook, determined that if the defendant is not substantially prejudiced, 
a plaintiff may amend a summons that was not signed by an attorney licensed to 
practice in Minnesota to include a signature of an attorney admitted to the 
Minnesota Bar. DeCook v. Olmsted Med. Ctr., Inc., 875 N.W.2d 263, 269 (Minn. 
2016). 
95.  Cf. 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1218 (3d ed. 2013) (“[T]he federal rules were intended to remove 
the rigidity of the codes and common law and allow the pleader to use his own 
judgment about how to tell his story.”). 
96.  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
97.  See, e.g., Jason A. Cantone et. al., Whither Notice Pleading?: Pleading Practice
in the Days Before Twombly, 39 S. ILL. U. L.J. 23, 28 (2014) (“[In 1955] [t]he Advisory 
Committee stated that the original rule ‘adequately sets forth the characteristics of 
good pleading . . . and requires the pleader to disclose adequate information as 
the basis of his claim for relief . . . .’”). 
98. 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957).
99.  Cantone, supra note 97, at 29–32 (discussing how the Supreme Court
15
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In 2007 and 2009, however, the Court issued decisions widely 
regarded as heightening pleading standards. In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, the Court held that Conley “ha[d] earned its retirement” 
and a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim of relief 
that is plausible on its face.”100 Two years later, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
the Court further clarified these standards when it held that 
conclusory statements or mere recitals of elements in a complaint 
will not survive a motion to dismiss.101 
When the United States Supreme Court introduced its 
“plausibility” standard for pleadings, many states followed suit;102 
Minnesota, however, did not.103 The Minnesota rule governing 
pleading states, in part, that “a pleading which sets forth a claim for 
relief . . . shall contain a short and plain statement of the claim 
largely followed the pleading standard it laid out in Conley in the fifty years after its 
decision). But see Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L.
REV. 987 (2003) (discussing how federal courts imposed non-rule heightened 
pleading standards after Conley). 
 100.  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563, 570 (2007). Interestingly 
enough, the Court in Twombly made it clear that it was not applying a heightened 
standard of pleading, likely confusing many commentators, legal scholars, and law 
students alike. See id. at 569 n.14. 
 101.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In setting this standard, the 
Court introduced a two-pronged approach when considering a motion to dismiss: 
first, a court must remove all pleadings that are mere conclusions; then, a court 
will consider “well-pleaded factual allegations” and “determine whether they 
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679.  
 102.  See, e.g., Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 888 N.E.2d 879, 890 (Mass. 
2008) (“We agree with the Supreme Court’s analysis of the Conley language, which 
is the language quoted in our decision in Nader v. Citron . . . and we follow the 
Court’s lead in retiring its use.”); Doe v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Neb., 788 
N.W.2d 264, 278 (Neb. 2010) (“[W]e hold that to prevail against a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts, accepted 
as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”); Sisney v. Best Inc., 
754 N.W.2d 804, 809 (S.D. 2008) (“[W]e adopt the Supreme Court’s new 
standards.”). But see, e.g., Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 189 P.3d 344, 347 (Ariz. 
2008) (declining to adopt the Twombly-Iqbal “plausibility” standard); Hawkeye 
Foodservice Distribution, Inc. v. Iowa Educators Corp., 812 N.W.2d 600, 608 (Iowa 
2012); Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 437 
(Tenn. 2011); McCurry v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, 233 P.3d 861, 863 (Wash. 
2010). 
 103.  See Stephen C. Rathke, Pleadings Plain or Plausible: Minnesota Claims 
Survive Twombly/Iqbal Challenge, BENCH & B. MINN. (Oct. 8, 2014), 
http://mnbenchbar.com/2014/10/pleadings-plain-or-plausible/ (discussing that 
the Minnesota Supreme Court has refused to adopt the Twombly-Iqbal standard 
that is now used in federal courts). 
16
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showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and a demand for 
judgment for the relief sought.”104 This rule highlights Minnesota’s 
notice pleading standard—one that is met as long as documents 
involved in pleading put the party being sued on reasonable notice 
of legal action.105 Thus, Minnesota continues to follow the original 
notice pleading standard laid out in Conley v. Gibson and has 
refused to adopt Twombly-Iqbal’s “plausibility” standard.106 It is 
therefore important to address the history of Minnesota’s notice 
pleading standard and the state’s rejection of the Twombly-Iqbal 
standard. 
In 1963, the Minnesota Supreme Court issued a decision, 
Northern States Power Co. v. Franklin, making it clear it intended to 
follow the standard of notice pleading laid out in the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.107 This standard remained unchallenged until 
the Twombly and Iqbal decisions of 2007 and 2009, respectively.108 In 
 104.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.01. 
 105.  See Hansen v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 813 N.W.2d 906, 917–18 (Minn. 
2012) (“Minnesota is a notice-pleading state that does not require absolute 
specificity in pleading, but rather requires only information sufficient to fairly 
notify the opposing party of the claim against it.”). 
 106.  See, e.g., Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 603 (Minn. 2014). 
107.  265 Minn. 391, 394, 122 N.W.2d 26, 29 (1963). The court, in its decision, 
clearly laid out the purpose of Rule 8 and the way in which it governs pleadings in 
Minnesota courts: 
One of the fundamental changes intended by the adoption of our 
Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly as embodied in Rule 8, was to 
permit the pleading of events by way of a broad general statement 
which may express conclusions rather than, as was required under 
code pleading, by a statement of facts sufficient to constitute a cause of 
action. The functions of a pleading today are simply to give fair notice 
to the adverse party of the incident giving rise to the suit with sufficient 
clarity to disclose the pleader’s theory upon which his claim for relief is 
based . . . . No longer is a pleader required to allege facts and every 
element of a cause of action. A claim is sufficient against a motion to 
dismiss based on Rule 12.02(5) if it is possible on any evidence which 
might be produced, consistent with the pleader’s theory, to grant the 
relief demanded. To state it another way, under this rule a pleading 
will be dismissed only if it appears to a certainty that no facts, which 
could be introduced consistent with the pleading, exist which would 
support granting the relief demanded. 
Id. at 394–95, 122 N.W.2d at 29. 
 108.  Cf. Paul E. D. Darsow, Resolving the Bahr-Hebert-Franklin Paradox: 
Considerations for Applying Twombly and Its Progeny to Pleading and Rule 12 Motion 
Practice in Minnesota’s State Courts, 36 HAMLINE L. REV. 437, 440 (2013) (“Twombly 
17
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2008, the Minnesota Supreme Court first cited Twombly in Hebert v. 
City of Fifty Lakes.109 Two years later, the court further addressed 
Twombly when it decided Bahr v. Capella University.110 These 
decisions created tension between the Franklin standard and the 
standard many inferred from Hebert and Bahr.111 
In 2014, the Minnesota Supreme Court resolved this tension 
when it decided Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A.112 Walsh addressed whether 
the plaintiff’s claim of insufficient service should survive the 
pleading stage.113 In its decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
expressly rejected the plausibility standard and held that the 
plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently stated a claim for relief.114 First, the 
court determined that the plain language of Rule 8.01 does not 
include the word “plausible” in any sense.115 Second, the court 
and its progeny represent a profound change in pleading and Rule 12 motion 
jurisprudence which is impacting pleading and quite possibly Rule 12 motion 
practice in Minnesota’s state courts.”). 
 109.  744 N.W.2d 226, 235 (Minn. 2008). Hebert, however, relied heavily on the 
generous pleading standards laid out in Franklin and determined that the 
pleadings contained enough facts to state a claim for relief. Id. The court only 
included Twombly in a “see also” citation for the proposition that a pleading 
containing only legal conclusions will not survive a motion to dismiss. Id.  
 110.  788 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Minn. 2010). Here, the court seemed to consider a 
plausibility threshold in its analysis when it wrote, “[W]as Bahr’s opposition based 
on a legal theory and facts that are plausible? Bahr cannot merely claim a 
reasonable belief that the practices she opposed were forbidden by the MHRA and 
thereby avoid scrutiny of her claim.” Id. at 82 (emphasis added). 
 111.  Hebert and Bahr, by referencing the heightened “plausibility” standard 
that deviates from Franklin’s notice pleading standard, seemingly created a tension 
between the two schools of thought in Minnesota’s legal community. See Darsow, 
supra note 108, at 440 (discussing the need for the court to resolve what the 
author deems the “Bahr-Hebert-Franklin paradox”). 
 112.  See 851 N.W.2d 598, 600 (Minn. 2014) (“We granted review in this case to 
decide a question of great interest and consequence to parties and their lawyers in 
civil cases: whether the plausibility standard announced in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly . . . and Ashcroft v. Iqbal . . . applies to civil pleadings in Minnesota state 
court. We conclude that it does not.”); Rathke, supra note 103, at 24 (“On August 
6, 2014, the Minnesota Supreme Court answered the question in Walsh v. U.S. 
Bank, N.A. The court determined that no compelling reason exists to depart from 
the traditional pleading standard for civil actions (short and plain) by following 
Twombly/Iqbal and declined to do so.”). 
 113.  Walsh, 851 N.W.2d at 601. 
 114.  Id. at 606–07 (“Accordingly, we decline to adopt the plausibility standard 
. . . . Therefore, Walsh’s complaint satisfies the traditional pleading standard for 
civil actions in Minnesota.”). 
 115.  Id. at 604 (“Noticeably absent from Rule 8.01—and, for that matter, from 
18
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determined that the plausibility standard is out of line with the 
purpose and history of Minnesota Rule 8.01 “as a preference for 
non-technical, broad-brush pleadings.”116 And third, Walsh 
established five reasons for why the context of Rule 8.01 does not 
align with the plausibility standard.117 Ultimately, the court held 
that U.S. Bank did not produce a compelling reason for adopting 
the plausibility standard.118 Thus, Minnesota courts today continue 
to adhere to the traditional, less stringent notice pleading 
standard.119 
III. THE DECOOK DECISION
A. Facts and Procedure 
On January 22, 2010, medical personnel at Olmsted Medical 
Center delivered Jennifer and Ryan DeCook’s daughter, Mya 
DeCook.120 Four years later, in January 2014, the DeCooks 
attempted to bring a medical malpractice suit against Olmsted 
Medical Center (“Olmsted”) and several individual employees: 
the rest of our rules of civil procedure—is the word ‘plausible’ or any variation of 
it. U.S. Bank does not, and cannot, provide a textual basis for converting the words 
‘showing’ and ‘entitled’ into a plausibility standard.”). 
 116.  Id. at 605 (“[The plausibility standard] raises the bar for claimants . . . 
and thereby conflicts with Rule 8.01’s preference for non-technical broad-brush 
pleadings.”). 
 117.  Id. at 605–06. The five reasons the court gave were: (1) if a rule requires 
more specific factual pleading, such as Rule 9 governing “Pleading Special 
Matters,” it will expressly say so; (2) the “rules of civil procedure express a strong 
preference for short statements of fact in complaints”; (3) the given sample 
complaints demonstrate a preference for short and simple statements of fact; (4) 
the rules already provide for steps to ensure a complaint is not overly vague; and 
(5) there are already mechanisms in place to reduce the cost of discovery. Id. 
Some may question the Minnesota Supreme Court’s given reasons because both 
the federal and Minnesota rules governing pleadings contain identical text. 
However, the court specifically addressed this concern when it wrote, “We decline 
to [adopt the plausibility standard] despite the fact that the relevant text of Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 8(a)(2) is identical to the text of Minn. R. Civ. P. 8.01. The similarities 
between the federal rules and our rule make Twombly and Iqbal ‘instructive,’ but 
not binding.” Id. at 603 (internal citations omitted).  
 118.  Id. at 604 (“The relevant text of Rule 8.01 is the same today as it was 
when Olson and Franklin were decided. U.S. Bank has not presented a compelling 
textual reason to overrule those cases.”). 
 119.  Id.  
120.  DeCook v. Olmsted Med. Ctr., Inc. 875 N.W.2d 263, 265 (Minn. 2016). 
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Brenda Hanson, Darlene Pratt, Kenneth Palmer, Jack Perrone, 
Kimberly McKeon, and Ashley Morrow.121 
The DeCooks’ attorneys, Stephen Offutt and Patrick 
Thronson, contacted Olmsted in January of 2014 in an attempt to 
commence service on the defendants.122 At that time, Barbara 
Graham, Olmsted’s compliance officer, informed Offutt and 
Thronson that she was authorized to accept service for each 
defendant and was willing to do so by e-mail.123 On January 14, 
2014, the DeCooks’ attorneys emailed a copy of the summons and 
complaint to Graham.124 The following day, on behalf of all 
defendants, Graham returned a signed acceptance of service form 
to Offutt and Thronson.125 
In response, on January 31, 2014, the defendants filed a Joint 
and Separate Motion to Dismiss.126 In their accompanying memo, 
which was not filed until March 4, 2014, the defendants argued, in 
part, that: (1) the summons and complaint were defective; (2) the 
defendants were not served personally; and (3) the claimed service 
by e-mail was ineffective.127 Furthermore, the defendants filed two 
affidavits from Graham, neither of which included a denial that any 
of the six individual defendants had authorized her to accept 
service on their behalf.128 
 121.  DeCook v. Olmsted Med. Ctr., No. 55-cv-14423, 2014 WL 4798500 at *1–2 
(Minn. Dist. Ct. June 25, 2014), aff’d, No. A14-1180, 2015 WL 1880319 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Apr. 27, 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. DeCook v. Olmsted Med. 
Ctr., Inc., 875 N.W.2d 263. 
 122.  DeCook, 875 N.W.2d at 265. In addition, a minor point of contention in 
DeCook was whether a summons and complaint could be amended when they were 
only signed by an attorney not licensed to practice law in Minnesota. Id. 
Ultimately, the court, in its discretion, determined that the defendants were not 
prejudiced by allowing amendment of the summons and complaint. Id. at 267–68. 
Although a discussion regarding amending service is applicable to this author’s 
larger argument, the contention surrounding the specific signature is not 
discussed further in this Note. 
 123.  DeCook, 2014 WL 4798500 at *1. 
 124.  DeCook, 875 N.W.2d at 265. 
 125.  Id.  
126.  The defendants based their Motion to Dismiss on Minn. R. Civ. P. 
12.02(b), (c), and (d) for lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficient process, and 
insufficient service of process, respectively. Id. 
 127.  Id. at 265–66.  
 128.  Id. at 266. In addition, none of the defendants offered an affidavit 
showing they had not given Graham authorization to accept service on their 
behalf via e-mail. Id. 
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After learning of the defendants’ motion to dismiss, counsel 
for the DeCooks sent copies of the summons and complaint to the 
appropriate sheriff’s offices in an attempt to serve the defendants 
personally.129 Pratt was served personally on February 24, 2014; 
Hanson was served personally on February 27, 2014; and the 
summons and complaint were left with an employee at Olmsted on 
February 27, 2014, in an attempt to serve the remaining individual 
defendants.130 
The DeCooks first learned that the defendants objected to the 
purported defective summons and complaint when, on March 4, 
2014, the defendants filed their memorandum accompanying their 
motion to dismiss.131 In response, the DeCooks sent an amended 
summons and complaint to the appropriate sheriff’s offices to 
effectuate personal service.132 Once again, Pratt and Hanson were 
personally served while the summons and complaint were left with 
an Olmsted employee for the remaining defendants.133 
At the district court level, the court denied the defendants’ 
motion to dismiss for insufficiency of process and allowed the 
plaintiffs to amend their complaint.134 Furthermore, the court 
denied defendants’ motion to dismiss for insufficiency of service of 
process as to Olmsted, Pratt, and Hanson, as they were served in 
person.135 The district court, however, granted the motion to 
dismiss as to the remaining four defendants.136 
In response, Olmsted, Pratt, and Hanson appealed the 
decision, arguing that the summons and complaint were ineffective 
and the opportunity to amend should not have been given.137 The 
 129.  Id.  
 130.  Id.  
131.  DeCook v. Olmsted Med. Ctr., No. 55-cv-14423, 2014 WL 4798500, at *2 
(Minn. Dist. Ct. June 25, 2014). In addition, the DeCooks attempted to contact the 
defendants’ attorneys to determine why they filed a motion to dismiss but were 
unsuccessful in doing so. Id.  
 132.  DeCook, 875 N.W.2d at 266. 
 133.  Id.  
 134.  DeCook, 2014 WL 4798500, at *3. 
 135.  Id. at *1. The court reasoned that Graham was authorized to accept 
service on Olmsted’s behalf as Olmsted did not have an agent on file to accept 
service. Id. at *5. 
 136.  Id. at *1. Their motion to dismiss was granted on the grounds that they 
were not personally served and service through Graham was ineffective. Id. at *1, 
*5–6.
 137.  DeCook, 875 N.W.2d at 266. 
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DeCooks cross-appealed, arguing that the e-mail sent to Graham on 
January 14, 2014, constituted effective service for all defendants.138 
The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision, and the 
state supreme court granted review of both appeals.139 
Arguing before the Minnesota Supreme Court, the defendants 
asserted that a valid summons did not exist and the district court 
abused its discretion in allowing the amended process.140 The 
supreme court, however, found these arguments unconvincing 
because the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure and the policies 
behind the rules supported the lower court’s decision.141 Based on 
the district court’s discretion and the fact that the defendants were 
not prejudiced by the amended summons and complaint, the 
supreme court affirmed the court of appeals’ decisions and held 
that a defective summons and complaint can be amended.142 
On cross-appeal, the DeCooks argued that service via e-mail 
through Graham on behalf of all defendants was made effective by 
agreement.143 The DeCooks, the court found, had offered evidence 
of a valid alternative agreement with Graham, while the defendants 
offered no evidence to contradict the DeCooks’ evidence.144 In 
turn, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the district 
court erred in finding that the record had no evidence of an 
alternative agreement, reversed the lower court’s decision in part, 
and remanded the case to the district court to proceed against the 
previously dismissed defendants.145 Thus, the majority held that 
alternative e-mail service via an agent can be effective.146 
B. The Rationale of the Majority Opinion 
In its analysis, the majority considered the plain language of 
Rules 4.01, 4.07, and 11.01.147 In doing so, it concluded that the 
district court was within its discretion to allow the amendment of a 
 138.  Id.  
 139.  Id.  
 140.  See id. at 267–69. 
 141.  See id. at 267–70. 
 142.  Id. at 272. 
 143.  Id. at 270. 
 144.  Id. at 271. 
 145.  Id. at 272. 
 146.  See id.  
 147.  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.01, 4.07, 11.01; DeCook, 875 N.W.2d at 266–68. 
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defective summons and complaint.148 Furthermore, the court 
reasoned that discretionary amendments help ensure that cases are 
solved on “their merits rather than . . . by dismissal on technical 
grounds.”149 Ultimately, the majority concluded that the defendants 
were not prejudiced by the amendment because they were on 
notice of the suit and the plaintiffs promptly corrected their 
mistake.150 
The main point of contention in DeCook, however, arose in the 
discussion of the second issue: insufficient service. The majority 
and dissent disagreed as to whether the district court erred in 
ruling in favor of individual defendants Palmer, Perrone, McKeon, 
and Morrow for insufficient service.151 
The majority held that parties can agree to forego formal 
service,152 and agreement can provide for service via e-mail through 
an agent on the defendants’ behalf.153 To show an alternative 
agreement existed, the plaintiff has the burden of submitting 
evidence of service.154 If the plaintiff satisfies his burden, the 
defendant then has the burden of proving service was 
insufficient.155 Here, the majority found that while the record was 
flush with evidence establishing an agreement was made,156 the 
defendants presented no evidence to the contrary.157 
 148.  DeCook, 875 N.W.2d at 266–69. 
 149.  Id. at 268 (citing Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 273 v. Gross, 291 Minn. 158, 165, 
190 N.W.2d 651, 656 (1971)); see also MINN. R. CIV. P. 15.01 (parties can amend if 
justice allows). 
 150.  DeCook, 875 N.W.2d at 269–70. The majority also pointed out that the 
defendants’ only argument that they had been prejudiced was based on a loss of a 
statute of limitations defense. Id. at 269 n.5. However, as the court explained in 
Nelson v. Glenwood Hills Hospitals, loss of a statute of limitations defense on its own 
does not constitute prejudice for the sake of disallowing an amended summons. 
240 Minn. 505, 512–16, 62 N.W.2d 73, 78–79 (1953). 
 151.  DeCook, 875 N.W.2d at 272; id. at 272–73 (Dietzen, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 152.  Id. at 270 (majority opinion). 
 153.  Id.; see MINN. R. CIV. P. 3.01(b). 
 154.  DeCook, 875 N.W.2d at 271 (citing Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith, 754 
N.W.2d 377, 384 (Minn. 2008)). Furthermore, the majority noted that a plaintiff’s 
burden to submit evidence of service “is a low hurdle.” Id.  
 155.  Id. 
 156.  See id. 
 157.  Id.  (“[The defendants] submitted no contradictory evidence.”). 
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C. The Rationale of the Dissenting Opinion 
The dissent argued that no alternate agreement was made 
because the plaintiffs failed to produce any affirmative agreement 
from the defendants.158 Essentially, the dissent took a literal 
approach to Rules 4.05 and 3.01(b) of the Minnesota Rules of Civil 
Procedure in its analysis.159  Put another way, the dissent was 
concerned that the DeCooks could not provide an explicit 
agreement from Olmsted authorizing alternative service; they 
could only provide an e-mail from Graham, Olmsted’s alleged 
agent. Furthermore, the dissent reasoned that an individual’s 
authorization to accept service on another’s behalf must be shown 
by actual authority, not just apparent authority,160 which the dissent 
concluded that the DeCooks failed to do.161 In other words, an 
individual has the authority to accept service for another only if 
that authority is proven, rather than assumed. The majority, 
however, countered that argument by deciding that once the 
plaintiff has produced evidence of an agreement, the burden shifts 
to the defendant to show the agent had only apparent authority.162 
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Courts Ensuring Service Gives “Reasonable Actual Notice” Would 
Align with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
Ultimately, the DeCook court arrived at a fair and practical 
conclusion. Currently, Minnesota generally adheres strictly to the 
rules of service by seeking to ensure both that defendants have 
both actual notice of a suit and that the rules governing service are 
narrowly followed.163 Justice, on the other hand, would be better 
 158.  Id. at 274 (Dietzen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[O]ur 
rules of civil procedure provide that the plaintiff must establish authority to accept 
service of process through the submission of a writing either signed by the 
defendant or electronically submitted by the defendant.”); see MINN. R. CIV. P. 
3.01(b), 4.05.  
 159.  See DeCook, 875 N.W.2d at 272–79 (Dietzen, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 160.  Id. at 277.  
 161.  Id. at 276. 
 162.  Id. at 272 (majority opinion). 
 163.  See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Allen, 590 N.W.2d 820, 822 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1999) (“If the manner of service is not authorized by rule 4, it is not effective.”); see 
also Jan I. Berlage, A Clear Message Regarding Service of Process on Joint Ventures & Joint 
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served if Minnesota courts focused on ensuring that service takes a 
form of what can be called “reasonable actual notice” to the party 
being sued. First, in this context, the term “reasonable” aligns most 
with the principle of substantial compliance.164 If a party 
substantially complies with the rules of civil procedure governing 
service, then the “reasonable” element is satisfied.165 Second, the 
term “actual notice” aligns closely with the underlying theory of 
notice pleading.166 If service gives the defendant adequate notice of 
suit against it, then the “actual notice” element is satisfied.167 Thus, 
under this proposed framework, if a plaintiff substantially complies 
with the rules of service and the defendant has actual notice of suit, 
“reasonable actual notice” is satisfied, and, in turn, service is 
effective. 
Although the proposed “reasonable actual notice” standard 
would be a slight deviation from precedent, the standard would 
better serve Minnesota’s best interest. Currently, Minnesota 
precedent only considers actual notice when service is effectuated 
at the defendant’s place of abode.168 This principal is largely 
derived from a case decided over twenty-five years ago: Thiele v. 
Stich.169 In Thiele, the Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned that “no 
place” other than the defendant’s place of abode is “more desirable 
for the papers to be left.”170 This idea, however, seems largely 
outdated. Today, people have become increasingly nomadic, 
relying on the internet and their phones to receive information, as 
Enterprises—Ryan Contracting, Inc. v. JAG Investments, Inc. & Mellett v. Fairview 
Health Services, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 545, 546 (2002) (“The Minnesota 
Supreme Court takes service of process seriously and will strictly construe the rules 
applicable to it.”). 
 164.  See Koski v. Johnson, 837 N.W.2d 739, 743 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013) (“When 
a party substantially complies with Minn. R. Civ. P. 4, actual notice of the summons 
will subject a defendant to the jurisdiction of the court.” (internal quotations and 
citations omitted)).  
 165.  See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text. 
 166.  See supra Section II.C. 
 167.  See, e.g., Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kirkevold, 87 F.R.D. 317, 323 (D. 
Minn. 1980) (“The Court has concluded that under the circumstances present 
here, the method of service employed by plaintiff was reasonably calculated to 
provide actual notice to defendant . . . [a]s defendant Kirkevold received prompt 
actual notice of the pendency of this action, the rules governing service should be 
liberally construed to uphold the service.”). 
 168.  See supra notes 34, 42, and accompanying text. 
169.  425 N.W.2d 580 (Minn. 1988). 
 170.  Id. at 584. 
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opposed to mail and door-to-door visitors.171 In reality, there seems 
to be little to no difference between actual notice at a place of 
abode and actual notice through other means. 
Although some may point to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Jaeger to argue against the substantial compliance 
portion of the proposed reasonable actual notice standard,172 the 
Jaeger decision relied on antiquated principles set forth in the 
court’s 1930 MacLean decision. The court decided MacLean almost 
ninety years ago, before the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure 
were adopted.173 Moreover, the MacLean court discussed statutory 
service and not service by rule.174 Although the Jaeger court 
explained that the plain language of Rule 4.03(a) supports the 
court’s interpretation of substitute service in MacLean,175 one can 
imagine that the principles behind such an old case may be less 
relevant today.176 Thiele, on the other hand, was decided far more 
recently, in 1988.177 While outdated, Thiele is more recent than 
MacLean; therefore, it likely better reflects current legal principles. 
 171.  Cf. Jenara Nerenberg, Unsettled Is Making It Possible for Families To Be 
Digital Nomads, Too, FAST COMPANY (June 15, 2016, 6:50 AM), 
http://www.fastcoexist.com/3060898/unsettled-is-making-it-possible-for-families    
-to-be-digital-nomads-too (discussing an organization that allows individuals and 
families to become part of an “office-free, world-traveling life”); Latest 
Telecommuting Statistics, GLOBAL WORKPLACE ANALYTICS (Jan. 2016), 
http://globalworkplaceanalytics.com /telecommuting-statistics (“Fortune 1000 
companies around the globe are entirely revamping their space around the fact 
that employees are already mobile. Studies repeatedly show they are not at their 
desk 50–60% of the time.”). 
 172.  See Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings, LLC, 884 N.W.2d 601 (Minn. 2016). 
 173.  Id. at 609 (“MacLean predates our adoption of the Minnesota Rules of 
Civil Procedure . . . .”). In Jaeger, the court explained that the statement in Thiele v. 
Stich, which suggested that substantial compliance with Rule 4 is sufficient, was 
only dicta and, thus, need not be followed. Id. at 610 (citing 425 N.W.2d 580, 584 
(Minn. 1988)). Dicta or not, however, Thiele was decided significantly more 
recently than MacLean and therefore likely better reflects current legal principles. 
174.  MacLean v. Lasely, 181 Minn. 379, 232 N.W. 632 (1930) (“It is clear that 
the proof of service was made in statutory form. It is equally clear that the statutory 
substituted personal service was technically made.”). 
 175.  See supra text accompanying notes 50–53. 
 176.  Cf. Zara Watkins, When Is a Case Too Old To Cite? POINTS OF INTEREST 
(Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.onpointexpertise.com/interestpoints/when-is-a-case 
-too-old-to-cite (discussing the proposition that the more recent the case citation, 
the more persuasive it is). 
 177.  Compare MacLean, 181 Minn. 379, 232 N.W. 632, with Thiele, 425 N.W.2d 
580. 
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This section illustrates why, and how, the proposed reasonable 
actual notice standard would be a better standard for Minnesota. It 
begins by exploring the parallels between notice pleading and 
service of process.178 Next, this section discusses the advantages of 
using technology in a shifting legal landscape while drawing 
comparisons to Rule 23’s “best notice that is practicable” 
standard.179 Then, it contends that “reasonable actual notice” better 
aligns with the policy behind the Minnesota Rules of Civil 
Procedure.180 Finally, this section introduces a slightly modified 
burden-shifting framework for analyzing reasonable actual 
notice.181 
1. The Principles of Service of Process Should Parallel the Principles
of Notice Pleading
For the most part, Minnesota has closely followed the federal 
construction and interpretation of the rules of civil procedure.182 
When the United States Supreme Court changed course and 
adopted a more stringent pleading standard, Minnesota had the 
opportunity to follow suit.183 The Minnesota Supreme Court, 
however, declined to follow the strict “plausibility” standard and 
elected to apply the standard it articulated in Franklin.184 The 
Franklin standard states that “[t]he functions of a pleading today 
are simply to give fair notice to the adverse party of the incident 
giving rise to the suit with sufficient clarity to disclose the pleader’s 
theory upon which his claim for relief is based . . . .”185 This same 
principle should guide Minnesota courts’ application of the rules 
governing service. 
Currently, most methods of service are effective only if they are 
strictly complied with.186 This creates a standard in which courts are 
 178.  See infra Section IV.A.1. 
 179.  See infra Section IV.A.2. 
 180.  See infra Section IV.A.3. 
 181.  See infra Section IV.B. 
 182.  See supra text accompanying notes 41–42, 83. 
 183.  See Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 606–07 (Minn. 2014) 
 184.  See N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 265 Minn. 391, 122 N.W.2d 26 
(1963); see also Stresemann v. Jesson, No. A13-1967, 2015 WL 7693339, at *4 
(Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2015) (affirming district court’s denial of defendant’s 
motion to dismiss while acknowledging that the information contained in 
plaintiff’s claim would likely not defeat a motion for summary judgment). 
 185.  Franklin, 122 N.W.2d at 29. 
 186.  See, e.g., Burke v. $2285 U.S. Currency, No. A09-327, 2009 WL 3427014, at 
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vastly more concerned with whether a method of service is strictly 
appropriate by rule and in theory than whether a particular 
method of service has real-life practicality.187 This standard gives 
little credence to the practicality of service and largely ignores what 
may be best in modern day practice.188 Although there are benefits 
to following a narrow legal interpretation—uniformity and 
predictability, for example189—this approach likely resolves 
numerous cases on technicalities rather than on the merits. 
Adopting a more pragmatic approach—one akin to notice 
pleading—would better ensure that meritorious claims do not fall 
through courts’ cracks.190 
*1 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2009) (citing Coons v. St. Paul Cos., 486 N.W.2d 771,
776 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992)) (“Service by mail requires strict compliance with 
Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.05 and is ineffective if an acknowledgement of service is not 
signed and returned by the defendant, regardless of the defendant’s actual notice 
of the lawsuit.”); see also 1 DAVID F. HERR & ROGER S. HAYDOCK, MINNESOTA 
PRACTICE: CIVIL RULES ANNOTATED § 4:6 (5th ed. 2016) (“Rule 4 is to be strictly 
applied and enforced. A defect in the method of service can deprive a court of 
jurisdiction over a defendant. If a defendant has no actual knowledge of an action, 
the service methods authorized by Rule 4 are to be strictly followed.”). 
 187.  Cf. Howard M. Erichson, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in All Federal 
Question Cases: A New Rule 4, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1117, 1126–33 (1989) (discussing 
the ways in which territorial service within state boundaries can highlight 
impracticalities and proposing a new Rule 4 to help account for said 
impracticalities). 
 188.  Cf. Friedrich K. Juenger, The American Law of General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 141, 149–51 (2001) (highlighting the difficulties the Supreme Court 
had with adopting clean and consistent rules for exercising personal jurisdiction 
over corporations); Stewart E. Sterk, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 98 IOWA 
L. REV. 1163, 1194–95 (2013) (discussing the practical inconsistencies with a 
court’s ability to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant when the defendant is 
simply served in the forum state).  
 189.  See Michael P. Healy, Communis Opinio and the Methods of Statutory 
Interpretation: Interpreting Law or Changing Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 539, 612 
(2001) (“Generally, rule-of-law value is present in a legal system characterized by 
predictability and continuity in the overall legal regime . . . .”). 
 190.  A pragmatic approach to the law is strongly supported by many 
prominent legal scholars. For example: 
Judge Richard Posner . . . has argued that the goal of statutory 
interpretation should be to produce the best results for society. Judge 
Posner defines pragmatism, at its core, as “a disposition to base action 
on facts and consequences rather than on conceptualisms, generalities, 
pieties, and slogans.” Bill Eskridge similarly urges that statutory 
interpreters should take public values into account and construe 
statutes dynamically—to reflect current social, political, and legal 
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Both the rules governing pleading and those governing service 
have the same general goal: to put the party being sued on notice 
of the suit.191 The primary function of service of process is to give a 
party the opportunity to appear in court and be given appropriate 
due process.192 Likewise, the main purposes of pleadings are to 
notify a party of the merits of a case and give that party the 
opportunity to defend against them.193 Although these doctrines 
may address slightly different concerns, each deals with the same 
underlying principle: giving a defendant the opportunity to defend 
against a claim. 
Moreover, not only do the pleadings and service doctrines 
address the same underlying principle, they are both challenged 
under the same Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure: Rule 12.194 If a 
defendant does not include a defense of insufficient service of 
process in a response pleading or a separate motion to dismiss, that 
defense will be waived.195 A defense of failure to state a claim upon 
contexts. 
Anita S. Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 DUKE L.J. 909, 993 (2016) (citations 
omitted). 
 191.  Compare Mumm v. Mornson, 708 N.W.2d 475, 481 (Minn. 2006) (stating 
that a complaint “should put the defendant on notice of the claims against him”), 
with 1 HERR & HAYDOCK, supra note 186, § 4:4 (“The purpose of the summons is to 
provide notice to the defendant of the action and the effect it may have upon the 
interests of the defendant.”). 
 192.  In re Skyline Materials, Ltd., 835 N.W.2d 472, 475 (Minn. 2013) (“Under 
Rule 4, the summons or other process is the document that invokes the 
jurisdiction of the court, compelling the defendant to appear.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 193.  See Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc. v. Newton, 646 N.W.2d 888, 899 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (“The purpose of the complaint is to advise the defendant 
as to the nature of the plaintiff’s claim.”). 
 194.  Defenses based on pleading and service of process are both located in 
Rule 12.02 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure and can be made by either a 
responsive pleading or a separate motion. A defense that a party was not served 
properly is written as “insufficiency of service of process,” MINN. R. CIV. P. 12.02(d), 
while “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” is the appropriate 
defense to assert against a plaintiff’s pleading, MINN. R. CIV. P. 12.02(e). 
 195.  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 12.08(a) (“A defense of lack of jurisdiction over the 
person, insufficiency of process, or insufficiency of service of process is waived (1) 
if omitted from a motion in the circumstances described in Rule 12.07, or (2) if it 
is neither made by motion pursuant to this rule nor included in a responsive 
pleading or an amendment thereof permitted by Rule 15.01 to be made as a 
matter of course.”); see also In re Estate of Sangren, 504 N.W.2d 786, 789 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1993) (holding that the defendant’s actual defense was insufficiency of 
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which relief can be granted, on the other hand, can be made at 
essentially any point.196 However, parties often elect to assert 
defenses against pleadings before a trial begins, by use of a 
responsive pleading or a motion to dismiss.197 In fact, many believe 
that the best time to raise a defense of failure to state a claim is at 
the motion to dismiss stage, before any discovery has begun.198 
Thus, many courts already address insufficient service of process 
and failure to state a claim for relief at the same juncture. In the 
interests of ease of proceedings and judicial economy, Minnesota 
would benefit from ensuring these two doctrines more closely 
mirror each other. 
What is more, other sections of the Minnesota Rules of Civil 
Procedure address the Rules’ overarching policy of accomplishing 
justice. For example, Rule 8.06 specifically declares that “[a]ll 
pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice.”199 This 
same theme largely underlies Rule 4.200 For instance, Rule 4.07 
service of process and the defendant waived that defense by failing to assert it in its 
answer). 
 196.  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 12.08(b) (“A defense of failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted, a defense of failure to join a party indispensable 
under Rule 19, and an objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim may 
be made in any pleading permitted or ordered pursuant to Rule 7.01, or by 
motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits.”). 
 197.  See, e.g., Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598 (Minn. 2014). In 
Walsh, the court was presented with the interesting situation in which the plaintiff, 
after being in default, claimed a defense of insufficiency of service of process, and 
the defendant turned around and asserted that complaint failed to state a claim 
for relief. Id. at 601. The court was then faced with making decisions both on the 
adequacy of service and the adequacy of the complaint. Id. at 606–07. 
Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit, in Yuhasz v. Brush Wellman, Inc., discussed the 
reasoning behind the federal version of failure to state a claim: “there is no 
general right to discovery upon filing of the complaint. The very purpose of Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ‘is to enable defendants to challenge the legal sufficiency of 
complaints without subjecting themselves to discovery.’” 341 F.3d 559, 566 (6th 
Cir. 2003) (quoting Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 738 
(9th Cir. 1987)).  
 198.  See, e.g., Mark Thomas Smith, Strategic Motions to Dismiss (or Lack Thereof), 
LITIG. NEWS, https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/trial_skills 
/pretrial-motion-dismiss.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2016) (advising on when the 
best time is to file a motion to dismiss). 
 199.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.06. 
 200.  Tharp v. Tharp, 228 Minn. 23, 27, 36 N.W.2d 1, 3–4 (1949) (discussing 
Minnesota courts’ tendency to grant amendments to summons when the 
defendant is not prejudiced, and, in turn, finding that the summons was “fatally 
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allows for service to be amended, as long as no party is substantially 
burdened.201 Both the majority and the dissent in DeCook mirrored 
this idea and wrote that a party should be able to amend a 
complaint as long as the defendant is not excessively burdened.202 
That same principle should guide a court’s analysis in determining 
whether an alternative method of service was effective. Clearly, the 
defendants in DeCook had notice of suit and were not prejudiced, as 
they filed for dismissal less than three weeks after service was e-
mailed to Graham.203 Dismissing a case when a party has sufficient 
notice would be deciding that case on a “mere technicality,” a 
problem the courts consistently strive to avoid.204 
2. Reasonable Actual Notice Through the Use of Technology Allows
for Greater Flexibility in a Shifting Legal Landscape
Thomas Jefferson may have best articulated the need to 
embrace change in our legal system when he said, “[a]s [society] 
becomes more developed . . . as new discoveries are made . . . 
institutions must advance also to keep pace with the times.”205 
Often, however, the law is hesitant to adapt to societal change and 
growth.206 Likewise, change is often not seen on a wider scale until 
defective as in effect to be no summons at all” and thus could not be amended). 
 201.  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.07 (“The court in its discretion and on such terms 
as it deems just may at any time allow any summons or other process or proof of 
service thereof to be amended, unless it clearly appears that substantial rights of 
the person against whom the process issued would be prejudiced thereby.”). 
Although doing substantial justice and avoiding substantial burden are slightly 
different doctrines, each works in concurrence with the other. For instance, it is 
certainly just to ensure that no party is substantially burdened, and if a party is 
being substantially burdened, substantial justice is likely absent. 
 202.  DeCook v. Olmsted Med. Ctr., Inc., 875 N.W.2d 263, 267 (Minn. 2016); 
id. at 272 (Dietzen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 203.  Id. at 265. This is beyond the scope of this note, but this author believes 
that the medical industry already has significant protections in place against legal 
action. Arguably, medical malpractice suits do not need yet another shield in the 
form of mere technicalities of service. Focusing on a standard more in line with 
reasonable actual notice could help to level the legal playing field between the 
medical industry and ordinary individuals. 
 204.  See, e.g., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 273 v. Gross, 291 Minn. 158, 165, 190 
N.W.2d 651, 656 (1971) (“[R]ules of civil procedure are designed to effect the 
settlement of controversies upon their merits rather than to terminate actions by 
dismissal on technical grounds.”). 
 205.  See Thomas Jefferson Quotes, supra note 1. 
 206.  See REACTION AND RESISTANCE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 
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the United States Supreme Court sets a precedent that dictates 
change.207 Every year, society becomes more and more dependent 
on technology, especially as technology becomes further ingrained 
in law and all facets of life.208 Thus, an official recognition of e-mail 
as a sufficient alternative method of service as recent as 2015 is 
encouraging, but fairly surprising.209 Whether service should be 
allowed through electronic means is the subject of much debate.210 
When new methods arrive that can reasonably notify a party of an 
impending action, the rules governing service should be liberally 
construed.211 
Minnesota embraced this increasing prevalence of e-mail in 
2015 when the judiciary committee amended Rule 3 of the 
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure to specify that service may be 
accomplished via alternative forms, including e-mail, if consented 
to.212 Notably, however, neither Rule 3 (governing the 
commencement of an action) nor Rule 4 (governing service) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mentions the use of e-mail.213 
Similar to notice pleading, Minnesota Rule 3.01(b) and the 
accompanying committee note show the Minnesota court system’s 
(Dorothy E. Chunn, Susan B. Boyd, & Hester Lessard eds., 2007) (discussing the 
resistance that courts have faced in developing feminism into law and policy); see 
also Radcliffe Panel Focuses on Law and Social Change, HARV. MAG. (May 25, 2012), 
http://harvardmagazine.com/2012/05/radcliffe-day-panel-focuses-on-law-social    
-change (highlighting a panel that discussed how law relies on non-legal social 
activists while social activists would not spur change as much without the court). 
 207.  See Linda C. McClain, Supreme Court Justices, Empathy, and Social Change, 89 
B.U. L. REV. 589, 602 (2009) (arguing that the court has the power and the duty to 
play a “catalytic role” in spurring social change). But see Michael Klarman, Lecture 
at the Georgetown Law Center’s Philip A. Hart Memorial Lecture: Courts, Social 
Change, and Political Backlash (Mar. 31, 2011) (transcript available at 
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/hartlecture/2) (highlighting instances of 
backlash to historic Supreme Court decisions). 
 208.  See generally Yvonne A. Tamayo, Are You Being Served?: Email and (Due) 
Service of Process, 51 S.C.  L. REV. 227 (2000). 
 209.  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 3.01(b). 
 210.  See supra Section II.B.2. 
 211.  Cf. Zuckerman v. McCulley, 7 F.R.D. 739, 740 (E.D. Mo. 1947) (“It has 
been held that the Rule on service should be construed liberally to effectuate 
service where actual notice of suit has been received by the defendant.”), aff’d, 170 
F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1948). 
 212.  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 3.01(b) advisory committee’s comment to 
amendment. 
 213.  Compare MINN. R. CIV. P. 3.01, and MINN. R. CIV. P. 4, with FED. R. CIV. P. 3, 
and FED. R. CIV. P. 4. 
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willingness to adopt a more pragmatic approach to its rules.214 As 
the legal landscape continues to shift and change, all courts would 
be well served by embracing a similar pragmatic approach. 
Service by publication illustrates a method of service that 
would benefit from technology’s aid. Service by publication may be 
used only if it falls into one of the five categories presented in Rule 
4.04(a).215 Furthermore, notice by publication continues to be 
measured under Mullane’s “reasonably calculated” standard.216 
Minnesota courts, however, have stringently stuck to the text of the 
rule and have not yet allowed for electronic notice by publication 
under Mullane’s standards.217 However, in present society, a 
defendant’s behavior does not always line up with the rigid rules of 
service.218 For example, the current rules governing service of 
process often fall short when a defendant elects to evade service.219 
With that in mind, technology-assisted service by publication may 
be better suited to notify a defendant of suit.220 As one 
commentator put it, “[t]he rigid construction of the current rule 
seeks to protect the defendant’s right to due process, but as 
modern society changes, it does so at the cost of fairness and 
 214.  See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 215.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.04(a). The five reasons are as follows: (1) a defendant 
has left the state to avoid service; (2) a plaintiff acquired a lien; (3) the action is 
for divorce and the court requires publication; (4) the action involves real or 
personal property; or (5) the action involves a  foreclosure or real estate lien. Id. 
 216.  See Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 173 (2002) (noting that 
“[d]ue process requires no more” than the reasonableness of service inquiry from 
Mullane). 
 217.  See Klander, supra note 38, at 250 (discussing that the Minnesota 
Supreme Court had an opportunity to “reevaluate the elements of an archaic rule 
and perhaps broaden them to reflect modern communication” in Shamrock 
Development, Inc. v. Smith, 754 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 2008), but instead “articulated a 
stricter interpretation of the rule”). 
 218.  See id. at 252. A clear example arises when a defendant is evading service 
but not doing so in a way that fits into the rigid five scenarios outlined in Minn. R. 
Civ. P. 4.04(a). 
 219.  Id. (“[W]hen the methods for providing notice do not conform to actual 
behavior, due process becomes a loophole, rather than a safeguard, for 
defendants to evade service.”). 
 220.  See Christopher B. Woods, Commercial Law: Determining Repugnancy in an 
Electronic Age: Excluded Transactions Under Electronic Writing and Signature Legislation, 
52 OKLA. L. REV. 411, 444 (1999) (“Electronic publication . . . could actually offer a 
greater likelihood of providing notice than the traditional method of service by 
publication.”). 
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judicial efficiency.”221 Ignoring technology’s use and place in society 
may cause negative effects in fairness and efficiency.222 
Rather than ignoring technology, Minnesota’s rule governing 
service by publication specifically acknowledges technology’s place 
in law in its 2015 amendment.223 Rule 4.04 allows courts to accept 
documents as long as the party signs them under threat of 
perjury.224 The committee included this amendment in 
acknowledgement of the difficulty and burden of procuring 
notarization for e-filed and e-served documents.225 The 2015 
amendment to Rule 4.04 again demonstrates Minnesota’s 
willingness to abandon outdated, technical portions of rules and 
embrace an approach that accounts for technology’s effects. 
Taking that approach one step further, some commentators 
suggest that electronic service should be allowed in most 
circumstances.226 For instance, one commentator, Jessica Klander, 
contends that the internet’s prevalence in today’s society will 
eventually create the situation where businesses and individuals will 
have more recognizable online addresses than physical addresses.227 
Therefore, an individual will likely be online much more often 
than he is at home or checking his physical mailbox.228 In addition, 
Klander asserts that refusing to allow electronic service may be 
unconstitutional, as it is the most reasonably calculated way to 
 221.  Klander, supra note 38, at 254. 
 222.  Id.  
 223.  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.04 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. 
 224.  Id. (stating that “Rule 4.04 is amended to implement a new statute 
directing the courts to accept documents without notarization if they are signed 
under the following language: ‘I declare under penalty of perjury that everything I 
have stated in this document is true and correct’” (quoting MINN. STAT. § 358.116 
(2014))). 
 225.  See id. (“The statute allows the courts to require specifically, by rule, that 
notarization is necessary. The difficulty in accomplishing and documenting 
notarization for documents that are e-filed and e-served militates against requiring 
formal notarization, and notarization often places a significant burden on self-
represented litigants.”). 
 226.  See, e.g., Klander, supra note 38. 
 227.  See id. at 257. Klander makes the compelling point that with use of the 
internet increasing exponentially, many individuals will soon have a more reliable 
online address than home address. Id. She invokes the example of Rio Properties, 
where plaintiffs were only able to find an online address for the business, and thus 
electronic service was approved. Id. (discussing Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l 
Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also supra note 73 (same). 
 228.  Klander, supra note 38, at 257–58. 
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notify a defendant of a suit.229 Furthermore, another commentator, 
Rachel Cantor, suggests that service via the internet will not only be 
more convenient, it will be safer, cheaper, and more reliable.230 
These assertions demonstrate a portion of the legal community’s 
view that the best methods of service are evolving and may not 
currently be in place—a view the courts should not ignore. 
Although not directly comparable, notice standards in class 
action suits also demonstrate the impact and benefit technology 
can have in notifying individuals of suit. As previously discussed, 
use of the “best notice practicable” standard in class action lawsuits 
reflects the legal system’s willingness to embrace the use of 
technology.231 In many situations, class members are difficult to 
identify, locate, and notify of the action. Thus, a number of courts 
have held that notice to class members via technological means is 
the best practicable way to notify potential class members of the 
suit.232 The law governing class actions, sticking almost exclusively 
to notice by mail or notice by publication, did not always embrace 
these means.233 Now, however, facing increases in class action suits 
and sophistication of technologies, courts are embracing use of 
technology in class notification.234 
Service of process standards, in many respects, parallel the 
progression of notice standards governing class action suits. As 
individuals move away from traditional addresses and focus more 
on their online presence, courts will be faced with new challenges 
 229.  Id. at 260 (“Electronic communication has caused the foundation of 
Minnesota Rule 4.03 to become archaic, and the evidence of the numerous 
judicial and public policy benefits indicates the need for statutory reform. In fact, 
the lack of electronic alternatives to service of process may very well be an 
unconstitutional oversight.”). 
 230.  See Rachel Cantor, Internet Service of Process: A Constitutionally Adequate 
Alternative?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 965–66 (1999) (discussing the ways in which 
internet service “has the potential to be more secure, . . . more reliable,” and 
cheaper). 
 231.  See supra note 79–82 and accompanying text. 
 232.  See, e.g., Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781(7th Cir. 2004); 
Keirsey v. eBay, Inc, No. 12-cv-01200-JST, 2014 WL 644697 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 
2014); In re Glob. Crossing Sec. & ERISA Litig., 225 F.R.D. 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 233.  See generally Mirfasihi, 356 F.3d at 786 (“[N]ewspaper notice alone is not 
always an adequate alternative to individual notice. The World Wide Web is an 
increasingly important method of communication, and, of particular pertinence 
here, an increasingly important substitute for newspapers.” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
 234.  See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
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regarding service of process standards.235 With that in mind, it is 
likely only a matter of time before the Minnesota Supreme Court 
further authorizes use of technology in service of process. If 
Minnesota adopts the standard of “reasonable actual notice,” this 
transition will be significantly smoother, as the standard will already 
account for use of technology. 
For example, in 2008, an Australian court authorized the 
service of documents via Facebook.236 The court came to this 
decision after the plaintiffs attempted—eleven times—to personally 
serve the defendants but failed.237 The Australian court, considering 
the circumstances, found that serving the defendants via Facebook 
offered the best opportunity to give the defendants notice.238 This 
Note is in no way suggesting that service via Facebook should be 
authorized in a blanket fashion. However, Minnesota would be well 
served to take a page out of this Australian case’s book and allow 
service by any means if it gives the defendant “reasonable actual 
notice.” 
3. Reasonable Actual Notice Aligns with the Policy of the Minnesota
Rules of Civil Procedure
When considering a rule, the court should not be handcuffed 
to only determining its plain meaning; rather, the court must also 
consider the intent behind the adoption of the rule.239 In doing so, 
the court should seek to rule in a manner that is most in accord 
with public policy.240 The majority in DeCook, in its discussion, took 
both of these areas into consideration when it invoked the 2015 
 235.  See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 236.  See Andriana L. Shultz, Superpoked and Served: Service of Process Via Social 
Networking Sites, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 1497, 1497 n.1 (2009) (discussing the 2008 
Australian case). 
 237.  Id. 
 238.  Id.  
 239.  See Vandenheuvel v. Wagner, 673 N.W.2d 524, 525 (Minn. 2004) (“Rules 
of court are to be interpreted in the same manner as statutes and are to be 
‘construed in the sense in which they were understood and intended at the time 
the rule was promulgated.’” (quoting Nguyen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
558 N.W.2d 487, 490 (Minn. 1997))). 
 240.  Cf. MINN. R. CIV. P. 1 (“The factors to be considered by the court in 
making a proportionality assessment include, without limitation: needs of the case, 
amount in controversy, parties’ resources, and complexity and importance of the 
issues at stake in the litigation.”). 
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amendment to Rule 3.01(b) to support its decision.241 Although the 
dissent in DeCook argued that 3.01(b)’s 2015 amendment was not in 
effect when the claim was brought and was thus irrelevant,242 the 
amendment largely displayed the then-current state of the law. 
Thus, the majority pragmatically considered the notions of intent 
and public policy in invoking a more fluid interpretation of the law. 
Moreover, in general, the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure 
give ample discretion to judges in adjudicating disputes.243 In order 
to enforce the policies behind the rules of procedure, judges are 
given substantial discretion in many situations.244 In fact, one study 
reviewing a number of Minnesota statutes and rules found as many 
as 293 instances of judicial discretion in the Minnesota Rules of 
Civil Procedure.245 Rule 4, governing service, includes provisions 
giving discretion to the court.246 For instance, Rule 4.03(e), 
governing personal service to public corporations, provides that if 
service cannot be effectuated according to the enumerated ways in 
section (e), “the court may direct the manner of such service.”247 In 
addition, Rule 4.04(c)(3), governing service outside the United 
States, allows the court to direct service by means “not prohibited 
by international agreement.”248 And finally, Rule 4.07, governing 
amendments to service, gives the court discretion to “allow any 
summons or other process or proof of service thereof to be 
amended . . . .”249 
 241.  DeCook v. Olmsted Med. Ctr., Inc., 875 N.W.2d 263, 270 n.8 (Minn. 
2016); see also N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. City of Duluth, 243 Minn. 84, 88, 67 N.W.2d 635, 
638 (1954) (“The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.”). One 
could argue that the DeCook court, construing the intent of the rules at the time of 
adoption, did not find it valid to accept alternative e-mail service until the 2015 
amendment was put into place.  
 242.  DeCook, 875 N.W.2d at 276 (Dietzen, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
 243.  See, e.g., MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.03(e), .04(c)(3), .07. 
 244.  According to Black’s Law Dictionary, “judicial discretion” is defined as 
“[t]he exercise of judgment by a judge or court based on what is fair under the 
circumstances and guided by the rules and principles of law . . . . ” Judicial 
Discretion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 245.  See Stephen C. Aldrich & Michael Cass, Judicial Discretion Melding Messy 
Facts and Pristine Law, BENCH & B. MINN. (Nov. 11, 2013), 
http://mnbenchbar.com/2013/11/judicial-discretion/. 
 246.  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.  
 247.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.03(e). 
 248.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.04(c)(3). 
 249.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.07. 
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Reasonable actual notice would continue to give the court 
ample discretion in determining if service was valid. Currently, as 
discussed in the preceding paragraph, the Minnesota rules provide 
a fair amount of discretion in its rules governing service.250 Notice 
pleading similarly gives the court discretion in determining if a 
complaint gave the defendant sufficient notice of suit.251 The term 
“actual notice” in the proposed reasonable actual notice standard is 
akin to the standard governing notice pleading.252 Thus, the court 
would be given substantial discretion in determining whether 
service gave sufficient notice to the defendant and, in turn, 
whether the defendant had “actual notice.” In addition, the term 
“reasonable” seeks to determine if the rules of service were 
substantially complied with.253 With substitute service, the court 
again has discretion in determining whether the individual served 
is a person of “suitable age and discretion.”254 Therefore, in many 
instances, the court will have discretion in determining whether 
service was substantially complied with—thus aligning with the 
discretionary policy behind Rule 4 and the rules of civil procedure. 
From the opening of the rules, the court is tasked with issuing 
rulings that are “just.”255 Rule 1 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil 
Procedure sets out the “Scope of [the] Rules” and states that the 
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure “shall be construed and 
administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action.”256 Recently, Rule 1’s 2013 
amendment added more factors to ensure the judicial system’s 
resources are not abused.257 Generally, courts approach the rules in 
such a way as to ensure that disputes are resolved on merits and not 
 250.  See supra notes 243–49 and accompanying text. 
 251.  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.06 (“All pleadings shall be so construed as to do 
substantial justice.”). 
 252.  See supra text accompanying notes 166–67. 
 253.  See supra text accompanying notes 164–65.  
 254.  See, e.g., Holmen v. Miller, 296 Minn. 99, 105, 206 N.W.2d 916, 920 
(1973) (rejecting the argument that an individual served at the age of thirteen is 
presumptively not of suitable age and discretion and finding that the defendant 
did not offer evidence to show the thirteen-year-old was not of a suitable age and 
discretion). 
 255.  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 1 (stating the policy behind all civil decisions). 
 256.  Id. 
 257.  See 1 HERR & HAYDOCK, supra note 186, § 1.2 (“The overarching goal of 
this provision is to create savings of expense, time of the litigants, and time of the 
courts.”). 
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on mere technicalities.258 A reasonable actual notice standard 
would better reach this goal. 
If courts were to embrace the reasonable actual notice 
standard for service, judicial economy would benefit. Judicial 
economy is an ever-increasing concern to the American legal 
system.259 There are only so many judges and hours available to 
referee disputes; nonetheless, each year a staggering number of 
Americans petition for the help of the courts.260 Significantly, 
district courts must rule on motions to dismiss for insufficient 
service of process. In doing so, they are handcuffed to forming 
their analysis strictly around the lettering of Rule 4.261 When a party 
succeeds in a motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process, 
the case is most often dismissed without prejudice.262 This allows a 
plaintiff to re-file his suit, starting the entire judicial process over 
again.263 Presumably, this wastes significant time and resources of 
 258.  Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 273 v. Gross, 291 Minn. 158, 165, 190 N.W.2d 651, 
656 (1971) (“[W]e must . . . be guided by the principle that rules of civil 
procedure are designed to effect the settlement of controversies upon their merits 
rather than to terminate actions by dismissal on technical grounds. To that end, 
Rule 41.01 should be construed liberally, if possible, to avoid depriving a litigant of 
his day in court.”). 
 259.  See, e.g., United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) 
(“Its justification lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and 
fairness to litigants; if these are not present a federal court should hesitate to 
exercise jurisdiction over state claims, even though bound to apply state law to 
them . . . .”). 
 260.  See Infographic: Lawsuits in America, COMMON GOOD (July 17, 2012), 
http://www.commongood.org/blog/entry/infographic-lawsuits-in-america 
(noting that each year fifteen million civil cases are filed in the United States); 
State Court Caseload Statistics, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., 
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=30 (last visited Sept. 5, 2016) (profiling 
a record high of 102.4 million criminal and civil cases that were filed to state 
courts in 2006); cf. Kevin LaCroix, U.S. Securities Class Action Lawsuit Filings in 2015 
at Highest Level in Years, THE D&O DIARY (Jan. 3, 2016), 
http://www.dandodiary.com/2016/01/articles/securities-litigation/u-s-securities  
-class-action-lawsuit-filings-in-2015-at-highest-level-in-years/ (explaining why 
securities class action lawsuits were filed at such a high level in 2015). 
 261.  See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Allen, 590 N.W.2d 820, 822 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1999) (“If the manner of service is not authorized by rule 4, it is not effective.”). 
 262.  See, e.g., Lewis v. Contracting Nw., Inc., 413 N.W.2d 154, 156 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1987) (“The proper action to be taken by the court, if it finds insufficient 
service of process, is to dismiss the action without prejudice.” (quoting 1 DAVID F.
HERR & ROGER S. HAYDOCK, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: CIVIL RULES ANNOTATED § 12.8 
(1985) (emphasis omitted))). 
 263.  See Dismissal Without Prejudice, BLACK’S, supra note 244 (defining dismissal 
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both the court and the parties involved—resources that would be 
better spent adjudicating the merits of the case. Thus, such a strict 
interpretation around the rules of service quite possibly leads to 
less, not more, efficiency. 
The reasonable actual notice standard would give courts the 
breathing room needed to adjudicate cases more efficiently. 
Currently, as discussed above, the courts may only deem service 
effective if the method of service is clearly stated in the rule or an 
alternative method of service has been proven.264 The current 
method leaves out an array of situations where an individual may 
have substantially complied with the rules of service, the defendant 
was on notice of the suit, and yet the case was dismissed because 
the service did not follow the black letter of the law.265 Reasonable 
actual notice, however, would allow a party to prove that it did, in 
fact, substantially comply with the rules of service, the defendant 
had knowledge of the suit, and, thus, service was proper.266 The 
court, then, has the opportunity to measure the level of compliance 
with the reasonable actual notice standard against numerous other 
factors, such as time, money, and the court’s resources. Therefore, 
reasonable actual notice would help prevent the logjam of cases, 
repeated dismissals, and refiling of claims that often occur in 
Minnesota courts.267 With those principles in mind, reasonable 
actual notice could lead to a more efficient judicial system without 
sacrificing judicial integrity. 
B. The Reasonable Actual Notice Burden-Shifting Framework Would Not 
Signal a Significant Departure from the Current Burden-Shifting 
Framework 
The focus on which party carries the burden of proving 
effective service in DeCook is not misplaced.268 If a plaintiff claims an 
alternative method of service was effective, the court looks to a 
without prejudice as “[a] dismissal that does not bar the plaintiff from refiling the 
lawsuit within the applicable limitations period”). 
 264.  See, e.g., Allen, 590 N.W.2d at 822. 
 265.  See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Action Against Coleman, 793 N.W.2d 296, 302 
(Minn. 2011); Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580 (Minn. 1988). 
 266.  See infra Section IV.B. 
 267.  See supra notes 261–65 and accompanying text. 
268.  DeCook v. Olmsted Med. Ctr., Inc., 875 N.W.2d 263, 272 (Minn. 2016); 
id. at 272–73 (Dietzen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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burden-shifting framework in its analysis.269 First, the plaintiff has 
the burden to produce evidence of an agreement between the 
parties.270 Then, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that no 
agreement exists and, thus, service was ineffective.271 
Minnesota courts, however, should focus less on proving 
whether an alternative method of service was consented to and 
more on whether the service gave reasonable actual notice. If 
Minnesota courts were to adopt the proposed reasonable actual 
notice standard, a slightly modified burden-shifting framework 
should apply. First, the plaintiff should carry the burden to show he 
made a good faith effort to comply with the rules of service272 and 
provided the defendant with reasonable notice of legal action.273 
Then, the burden should shift to the defendant to show that: (1) 
the plaintiff did not act in good faith;274 (2) the defendant did not 
have reasonable actual notice of legal action;275 or (3) the 
defendant was excessively burdened by the method of service.276 
Although defendants should continue to carry a higher burden of 
persuasion,277 having three potential alternative arguments would 
give them ample opportunity to establish a viable defense. Overall, 
this method would better serve the legal system’s goal of ensuring 
conflicts are resolved on their merits—not on mere technicalities.278 
V. CONCLUSION 
There are many observers and commentators on both sides of 
the service aisle.279 Some take a fairly strict view of service;280 others 
 269.  See supra text accompanying note 58–61. 
 270.  See Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith, 754 N.W. 2d 377, 384 (Minn. 2008). 
 271.  Id.  
 272.  Cf. Columbia Placer Co. v. Bucyrus Steam Shovel & Dredge Co., 60 Minn. 
142, 144–45, 62 N.W. 115, 116 (1895) (holding that when a plaintiff invites a 
defendant into the forum state to settle a dispute, service will not be proper unless 
made in good faith by the plaintiff). 
 273.  See supra Section IV.A.  
 274.  Cf. Columbia, 60 Minn. at 145, 62 N.W. at 116. 
 275.  See supra Section IV.A. 
 276.  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.07. 
277.  DeCook v. Olmsted Med. Ctr., Inc., 875 N.W.2d 263, 271 (Minn. 2016). 
 278.  See, e.g., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 273 v. Gross, 291 Minn. 158, 164, 190 
N.W.2d 651, 655 (1971). 
 279.  Cf. Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Coming to Terms with Strict and Liberal 
Construction, 64 ALB. L. REV. 9, 13 (2000) (“[S]trict or liberal construction can be 
found in cases arising under statutes spanning almost the entire alphabet—from 
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take a rather pragmatic view.281 Each side, however, can likely agree 
that the rules of civil procedure exist to ensure that the courts have 
the ability to give substantial justice.282 Courts are often tasked with 
solving difficult issues of service.283 These issues include anything 
from defendants evading service284 to determining whether to allow 
amendments to service285 or deciding whether service was 
effective.286 These issues can lead to disputes and jam the 
courthouse doors.287 Minnesota courts could take a step in the 
direction of efficiency and justice by adopting the “reasonable 
actual notice” standard. 
Some may point to this standard as carrying its fair share of 
risks. Most evidently, plaintiffs may attempt to take advantage of 
what some could interpret as a more relaxed standard of service.288 
Currently though, the legal system often finds itself wrestling with 
defendants evading service,289 leaving plaintiffs with fewer options 
to satisfy due process requirements. In addition, the proposed 
modified burden-shifting framework that goes along with 
reasonable actual notice would operate to counteract any perceived 
advantage given to plaintiffs.290 Thus, the reasonable actual notice 
standard would not be advantageous to either the plaintiff or the 
Adoption to Unemployment Compensation.”). 
 280.  Cf. Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 581, 582 (1990) (arguing that all criminal statutes should be strictly 
construed). 
 281.  See, e.g., Klander, supra note 38, at 250 (opining that the Minnesota 
Supreme Court missed an opportunity to reevaluate an archaic rule). 
 282.  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 1 (“[The rule] shall be construed and administered to 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.”). 
 283.  See, e.g., DeCook v. Olmsted Med. Ctr., Inc., 875 N.W.2d 263 (Minn. 
2016). 
 284.  See, e.g., In re Int’l Telemedia Assocs., Inc., 245 B.R. 713, 718 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ga. 2000). 
 285.  See, e.g., Tharp v. Tharp, 228 Minn. 23, 27, 36 N.W.2d 1, 3–4 (1949). 
 286.  See supra text accompanying note 41. 
 287.  See, e.g., United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). 
 288.  Cf. James Comber, Gareth Hughes & Emily Austin, Playing by the Rules or 
Playing Games? The Risks of Taking Advantage of an Opponent’s Mistakes in Litigation, 
ASHURST (June 2016), https://www.ashurst.com/publication-item 
.aspx?id_Content=13235 (“Both the English and Hong Kong cases highlight that 
parties must ensure litigation is conducted efficiently and avoid game playing over 
procedural errors by opponents.”). 
 289.  See supra notes 219–20 and accompanying text. 
 290.  See supra Section IV.B. 
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defendant; rather, the standard would be advantageous to the 
justice system as a whole. 
The reasonable actual notice standard would aid Minnesota’s 
legal system in its continued oversight of the principles governing 
service. Whether it be discussing the merits of alternative service in 
DeCook,291 or actual notice in Jaeger,292 issues of service are clearly at 
the forefront of our legal landscape. Typically, the legal system 
strives to make doctrinal changes in gradual, incremental 
fashion.293 This allows courts to be adaptive while still cautioning 
against making brash, knee-jerk decisions that will seem outdated 
within a few years.294 The proposed “reasonable actual notice” 
standard accounts for that concern by implementing a broad rule 
that allows courts to continue to substantially stick to the rules of 
civil procedure and precedent while remaining flexible for what is 
most in accord with justice.295 The alternative, relying on future 
Supreme Court decisions to interpret and overrule previous cases, 
has the potential to implement far reaching change, but it may not 
age well, and it may even lead to more uncertainty and unreliability 
in service. Adopting the proposed “reasonable actual notice” 
standard alongside a slightly modified burden-shifting framework, 
however, could operate to make our justice system fairer through a 
relatively small, incremental change. 
291.  DeCook v. Olmsted Med. Ctr., Inc., 875 N.W.2d 263 (Minn. 2016). 
292.  Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings, LLC, 884 N.W.2d 601, 609 (Minn. 2016). 
 293.  Saul Levmore, Interest Groups and the Problem with Incrementalism, 158 U. 
PA. L. REV. 815, 816 (2010) (“Since legislatures, courts, executive officers, 
administrative agencies, and even voters interact, incremental lawmaking is often 
the strategy most respectful of each player’s role . . . . Leading commentators 
encourage incrementalism.”). 
 294.  Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 362–66 
(2006) (discussing the doctrine of judicial minimalism, which encourages judges 
to make small changes and avoid broad sweeping rulings). 
 295.  See supra Part IV. 
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